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In 2008 the global financial crisis swept the developed world. 
Despite hopes to the contrary, the impact quickly spread to developing 
countries, through the adverse effects of financial markets, export 
demand, capital flows and remittances. With a few exceptions the 
international financial institutions advised governments of low income 
countries against expansionary fiscal measures to counter the impact of 
the global crisis (Weeks, Forthcoming 2011).
Generally, both the World Bank and IMF are sceptical about the 
usefulness of active fiscal policy. While they might concede that such 
policy could be effective in developed countries, they generally regard 
it as irrelevant for low income countries.  
It is certainly true that monetary policy is largely irrelevant for most low 
income countries, especially in Africa, where almost 20 governments are 
bound by common currency agreements or restrictive exchange-rate 
arrangements (see Weeks 2010). However, countercyclical fiscal policy 
can indeed be effective in low income countries if properly designed 
(see Weeks 2009a, 2009b). 
During 2008-2010, such a policy was implemented in several countries. 
Perhaps one of the least likely candidates for implementing an effective 
fiscal intervention was Sierra Leone, one of the poorest countries in 
the world, recently emerged from civil war, heavily aid dependent, and 
constrained by limited administrative capacity. But implement a fiscal 
stimulus the government did, and with notable success.  
In early 2009 Government experts projected that the decline in Sierra 
Leone’s export revenue would be 15-20% for the calendar year. Rather 
than maintain the policy status quo and simply hope for the best, the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MFED), with support 
from the local office of the United Nations Development Programme, 
designed a macro response that was put into effect by the third quarter 
of 2009.
Sierra Leone’s Policy Package
The policy package was designed to be countercyclical and short run 
in nature since it was specified to last only 18 months (extending into 
the first quarter of 2011). The package consisted of three elements: 1) 
a fiscal stimulus, 2) a real depreciation of the country’s currency, the 
Leone, and 3) an accommodating monetary policy. 
By coincidence the Caucus of African Governors of the IMF, World Bank 
and African Development Bank met in Freetown when the Sierra Leone 
countercyclical policy was initiated. On the first day of the meeting, 
the Caucus unanimously endorsed, in its “Freetown Declaration”, 
countercyclical intervention as the appropriate response in Africa to the 
global recession (see Weeks 2009a).
Essential to the design of the Sierra Leone package was the stipulation 
that the stimulus would be kept consistent with a trade balance and 
inflation rate that would not destabilise the economy. The Government’s 
ensuing depreciation of the exchange rate was designed to prevent 
a widening of the trade deficit, by stimulating exports and reducing 
imports. However, this depreciation could have breached the inflation 
constraint by raising the price of imports (by the so-called “pass-through” 
effect).  
Thus, it was necessary to carefully balance the exchange rate adjustment 
and the fiscal expansion in order to both achieve the desired stimulus 
and maintain macro stability. Technical modelling suggested that this 
balance could be attained with a fiscal expansion of just less than two 
percentage points of GDP and a nominal depreciation of slightly less 
than 20%.  In theory this combination would produce a real adjustment 
of 15%.  The central bank’s conversion of external assistance into 
domestic currency provided for de facto monetary accommodation of 
the fiscal and exchange rate measures.
The Success of the Stimulus 
The most recent statistics suggest that MFED was strikingly successful in 
counteracting the adverse effects of the global recession through such a 
set of macroeconomic interventions. 
The Figure shows that Sierra Leone’s growth displayed a characteristic 
post-war spurt in 2001-2002 and then converged towards the average 
for all low income African countries during 2003-2008. However, by the 
second half of 2009, when MFED initiated its stimulus, Sierra Leone was 
growing at over 3%, more than 1.5 percentage points higher than the 
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deficits. The drain on their holdings of foreign exchange reserves 
frequently forced them into a fiscal reversal or inflation-generating 
exchange controls. This ‘go-stop’ pattern of macro interventions 
repeated itself throughout Latin America, for example.
In contrast, the Government of Sierra Leone implemented what might 
be called a New Macro Intervention (NMI):  fiscal expansion based on a 
competitive exchange rate.  Part of the novelty of this policy package 
is its return to a pragmatic application of active macroeconomic 
interventions. 
The success of the NMI will depend, of course, on the specific 
institutional and economic characteristics of each country. For example, 
in countries with exchange-rate inelastic exports (e.g., petroleum), 
currency adjustment would affect only imports in the short run. For 
countries in common currency arrangements, the NMI could not be 
implemented due to the impossibility of adjusting the exchange rate.
However, for most developing countries the New Macro Intervention 
remains a feasible option. Hopefully, the Sierra Leone example will 
help motivate other governments in Africa to return to a development 
strategy that includes a countercyclical macroeconomic policy and 
abandons the counter-productive fiscal stance of rigidly maintaining 
balanced budgets geared to low inflation targets.
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average for all African low income countries, and the country continued 
to perform better than average in 2010.
The Table supports the view that Sierra Leone’s superior growth 
performance resulted, in significant measure, from the Government’s 
policies. On the basis of the annual data, public expenditure increased 
from 21% of GDP in 2008 to 22% in 2009, and then to over 23% in 2010 
(though the last is a preliminary figure). The stimulus effect is shown in 
the increase in the fiscal deficit, excluding external grants, in both 2009 
and 2010.   
At the same time, there was a real depreciation of about 15% in 
the Leone with respect to the US dollar from the third quarter of 
2009 through the first quarter of 2010, along with a slightly lower 
depreciation vis-à-vis the Euro (Weeks Forthcoming 2011). This 
depreciation was associated with a fall in the trade deficit from 2009 to 
2010, an outcome that proved better than anticipated.
Despite the success of Sierra Leone’s fiscal stimulus, it is important to 
highlight the continued fragility of its growth over the medium term.  
The war-created idle capacity that allowed rapid economic expansion 
during the early 2000s is exhausted. The economy remains heavily 
dependent on external grants (which are politically unreliable) to 
cover its trade deficit. Poor transport, power and communications 
infrastructure leaves private investment severely depressed.  
General Lessons
Nonetheless, there are some important lessons that could be drawn 
from the Sierra Leone experience, modest though it is. In the 1960s 
and 1970s governments of developing countries implemented 
countercyclical policies with little success. Their failures resulted, to a 
great extent, from a lack of attention to exchange rate competitiveness.







Exports Imports Trade 
Balance
2008 21.0 11.3 9.7 12.7 27.8 -15.0
2009 22.0 11.6 10.4 12.1 27.3 -15.2
2010 23.3 12.4 10.9 15.5 27.5 -12.0
 Fiscal and Trade Deficits (% of GDP), Sierra Leone 2008-2010
Sources:  Data for 2008-2009 from MFED (2010) and 2011 Budget Speech of the Minister of 
Finance.  The fiscal deficit does not include external grants.
